

25X1 22 September 1970

DCI BRIEFING FOR
23 SEPTEMBER NSC

JORDAN

I. Mr. President, the current fighting in Jordan marks the end of three years of restive and unhappy co-existence between the Jordanian Army and the Palestinian commando organizations, or "fedayeen."

A. Since the end of the 1967 fighting--and particularly since an initial confrontation in November 1968--the fedayeen have increasingly defied the authority and the government of King Husayn.

1. Their activity against Israel across the cease-fire lines has been sporadic and of no great military consequence, but the terrorists had become armed masters of the streets in Jordan's cities.

B. It has been our estimate all along that in an outright showdown between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Army, the government troops would prevail.

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1. In each successive crisis, however, the King--concerned over the certainty of heavy civilian casualties--had backed away in the crunch, and restrained the Army.

II. This time the King

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decided that the showdown could no

longer be postponed if he wanted to retain his throne and rule with a Jordanian--rather than a Palestinian--government.

A. In the capital of Amman, the fedayeen have dug in for a last-ditch stand, but they are gradually being rooted out or destroyed by tanks and artillery, at great cost to the city and its population.

B. It is no longer, however, a contest strictly between the Jordanian Army and the fedayeen.

1. In the north, Syrian troops began armed incursions last Friday, and crossed the border in force on Sunday.

25X1

4. Since then, the Jordanian forces in the north have been stiffened by additional tanks from the Amman area, and the small Jordanian Air Force is making some effective strikes. The Syrian advance appears to have been checked about 15 miles south of the border, and the Jordanians are taking a fairly heavy toll of enemy armor.

25X1

III. The King and the fedayeen appear to have been moving irresistably toward this showdown all year.

- A. Last February, Husayn issued a set of law-and-order decrees designed to make the commandos submit to government control and reduce their armed presence in Amman.
 - 1. Violent fedayeen resistance left about 60 dead, and caused the King to withdraw his decrees.
 - 2. The settlement imposed certain restrictions on the Palestinian groups, but failed to spell out who would enforce them, enabling the fedayeen to claim that they had merely agreed to discipline themselves.
- B. Fighting erupted again in June--apparently touched off by clashes between extremists on both sides. It culminated in another victory for the fedayeen, and in particular for the radical PFLP, or Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
 - 1. The PFLP's seizure of 32 foreign hostages in Amman's Intercontinental Hotel seems to have been the main factor which forced

the King to agree to dismiss two Army leaders--both royal relatives and long-standing proponents of a crush-the-fedayeen policy.

C. The present crisis began with a series of clashes between the terrorists and Jordanian police during and after a meeting of the Palestine National Council, called on August 27 to protest Jordan's acceptance of the U.S. peace initiative.

1. For the next three weeks, the fighting ebbed and flowed as repeated cease-fire agreements were negotiated, only to collapse through non-observance by either side.

25X1

3. The situation was complicated on September 6 by the PFLP airliner hijackings. The King--with little leverage to apply to the hijackers--wanted the hostages out of Jordan before the showdown began, and his temporizing served only to convince the fedayeen of the government's impotence.

IV. On September 16, the King appointed a military government headed by Brigadier Muhammad Daud, with General Habis Majali as military governor-general and commander-in-chief of the Army. The King told the U.S. Embassy that he was firmly intent upon establishing law and order in Jordan through the new government.

A. For this mission, the Jordanian Army has a strength of about 58,000. There are two infantry divisions; one armored division--including the Special Royal Guard battalion defending the royal palace; one air defense artillery brigade; one desert reconnaissance battalion; one airborne company; and combat support services.

B. The Palestinians are known to have had some 14,000 regular fighters in 11 separate major fedayeen organizations.

1. Since the June crisis, however, the comandos have been passing out guns to any Palestinians willing to take them, so that we cannot accurately estimate the number of Palestinians in arms against the government.
- C. Allied with the fedayeen are troops of the Palestinian Liberation Army, in three units which have been attached to the Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian armies.
 1. The 3,000-man contingent under Syrian command has already been committed, and serves among other things as a cover--however implausible--for the regular Syrian troops fighting in north Jordan.
 2. The Syrian government also maintains and directs one of the major fedayeen groups, Saiqa.

25X1

4. The third PLA "brigade" is still in Egypt.

D. Thus far the 17,000 Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan have not intervened in any significant way.

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2. Iraqi forces in Jordan have upwards of 200 tanks and some artillery.

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V. We have no firm evidence on the whereabouts of the 54 hostages from the hijacked airliners still in fedayeen hands.

A. Early this week government sources said they believed the hostages were being held in small groups, some in Zarqa northeast of Amman, and some in an area of the Wahdat refugee camp in Amman which had not yet been reached by the

fighting.

1. The King at that time indicated that before the Army attacked the rest of the Wahdat camp he would send in his special forces units to look for the hostages.
2. There has been no word that any of the hostages have been found, however, and at last reports the major portion of Wahdat was burning.
3. Jordanian troops reportedly have taken most of Zarqa and are engaged in mopping up, but here again there has been no information about the hostages.

B. Spokesmen for the PFLP said earlier this week that the hostages were safe in areas away from the fighting. They urged a speedy conclusion of negotiations on the grounds that some of the hostages needed medical attention.

1. Later, a PFLP spokesman said the remaining hostages would be treated as "prisoners of war" because of the attitude of their governments in the current crisis.
2. The radical fedayeen group has apparently been trying, however, to make two separate deals on releasing the 54 foreigners.

3. One deal would involve the immediate release of the Swiss, West German and British hostages in exchange for seven PFLP members held in those countries.
4. The second deal would barter American and Israeli nationals for an unspecified number of Arab and Palestinian prisoners in Israeli hands.

VI. Arab leaders nominated by the emergency summit conference in Cairo have headed for Amman to try to negotiate a cease-fire between King Husayn and Fatah leader Yasir Arafat. At the present level of polarization, however, and without any clear-cut outcome of the fighting, there appears to be little chance that either leader would offer terms which the other would not regard as tantamount to a surrender ultimatum. All the middle ground has been tried and found wanting in the past by both sides.

A. Soviet diplomats are reported to be working with the would-be Arab mediators in urging a compromise, and they may be working on the Syrians to damp down their intervention in the north.

1. Moscow's public reaction has centered on

warnings against Western or Israeli intervention, but the Soviet Charge in Washington Monday conveyed assurances that the Soviet Union has urged Syria to break off its fighting in Jordan.

2. An Egyptian diplomat at the United Nations said that a Soviet demarche to the Syrians on Monday had been "very clear in conveying to the Syrians the Soviet desire that they remove their troops."

B. Even if King Husayn succeeds in establishing control over his cities, it is not likely that the fedayeen movement will have come to the end of its road.

1. The most probable development in that event is that the Palestinians would go underground and become a clandestine insurgency.
2. Syria and Iraq would see little reason to terminate their support, and could well try to beef up the commando groups.
3. The fedayeen might also--as they have done in the past--try to shift the base for their operations against Israel to

Lebanese territory. The Lebanese Army has much less capability than the Jordanians to contain or control the commando groups.

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Next 13 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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22 September 1970

DCI BRIEFING FOR
23 SEPTEMBER NSC

WEST GERMAN "OSTPOLITIK"

- I. The Soviet-West German renunciation-of-force treaty, signed in Moscow on August 12, is a major milestone in the determined effort by Bonn Chancellor Willy Brandt to normalize relations with the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe.
 - A. Brandt must make considerably more progress in his Ostpolitik, however, before he will be in a position to submit the treaty to his Bundestag for ratification.
 - B. In the new treaty, Bonn accepts de facto the existing situation in Europe, including the division of Germany, and the German boundaries resulting from World War Two.
 - C. Bonn and Moscow both pledge to avoid any use of force or threat to use force in their relations, and to seek the development of mutual economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations.

1. Bonn hopes that these measures in the short run will help to allay long-standing fears of German intentions, and thereby enable enough reconciliation with Eastern Europe to bring about more normal relations and the expansion of mutually beneficial contacts.
 2. Bonn also hopes that, over the longer term, the growth of such contacts will break down existing barriers between East and West, and foster conditions conducive to a gradual coming together of the divided parts of Germany.
- II. Moscow's favorable response to West Germany's Ostpolitik has put at least a tentative end to the harsh tones which have dominated Soviet relations with Bonn for more than 20 years.
- A. Moscow's preoccupation with its quarrel with China may well have been a major factor influencing the decision to seek a negotiated settlement of differences with West Germany, thus to securing its political and military flank in Europe.

B. Moreover, the Soviet-West German treaty in itself represents a considerable political plus for the USSR, realizing at relatively little cost to the Soviets, ^{certain} ~~an~~ objectives they have been pushing for since the end of the Second World War; *that is :*

1. In Soviet eyes, the treaty grants juridical recognition of the political and territorial gains the USSR has made in Eastern Europe.
2. Specifically, the Soviets have gained a legally binding West German acceptance of the existing borders in Eastern Europe and--implicitly--acceptance of the fact of two German states.
3. The Soviets probably hope that ultimately the atmosphere of detente inherent in Bonn's Ostpolitik can serve to undermine the strategic and political position of the United States in Europe by weakening the concept of Soviet menace which has led Western Europe to accept the necessity of the Atlantic alliance.

C. The Soviets also hope that the treaty will aid their lagging economy by providing access to the economic and technological resources of West Germany, and by creating a political climate favorable to the granting of the long-term credits which they need.

III. Several obstacles to the treaty's ratification and implementation remain to be overcome.

A. Foremost is Brandt's firm linkage of ratification to the negotiation by the Four Powers of a "satisfactory" agreement on Berlin.

1. To make the Soviets more forthcoming, Bonn has indicated its readiness to reduce West German political activities in West Berlin, but Brandt insists that the Soviets in return must recognize West Berlin's basic political, economic, and financial, and legal ties to West Germany, which are essential for the city's survival.
2. Bonn also wants improvements in procedures for West German civilian access

to the city and for West Berliners' access to East Berlin and East Germany.

3. Although the Soviets publicly disclaim any linkage between the outcome of the Berlin talks and ratification of the treaty, privately they concede the connection. They are likely to cite any positive developments in the talks as grounds for speedy ratification.
 4. The prospects for major Soviet concessions in Berlin are not good. Moscow is likely to demand a drastic reduction in Federal German political activities, but might offer some limited concessions on access.
- B. Within West Germany, the ratification problem is complicated by the attitude of the opposition Christian Democrats.
1. The CDU leaders are now less strident in their criticism than they were before the treaty was signed, but they remain highly suspicious of Brandt's policies. The price for their support includes significant

improvements for West Berlin, and even an easing of the repressive conditions in East Germany.

2. The government has enough votes to approve the treaty without CDU help, but realizes that it will be better for Germany to have the widest possible support for the major policy decisions embodied in the treaty.
3. The CDU is well aware of its potential leverage. Its forceful criticism early last summer of the government's negotiating principles ultimately stiffened Brandt's negotiators in getting certain improvements. For the moment, the opposition is taking a wait-and-see attitude. Its particular concern for Berlin may well serve to discourage any tendency on the part of Brandt to water down the linkage with a Berlin agreement.
4. The Berlin talks are likely to create a ticklish situation for the Western Allies. They must, of course, insist

on genuine improvements in the lot of the beleaguered Berliners, but if the talks bog down over this insistence, an impatient Brandt might well accuse the Allies of holding up action on treaty ratification.

IV. The existence of a number of ancillary documents signed with the August 12 treaty has given rise to a bit of interesting by-play. Communist sources have been floating rumors that there is a "secret annex," in which Brandt has given away a good deal more than the text of the treaty would convey.

A. The intent appears to be to exaggerate the extent of West German concessions, in order to justify Moscow's conclusion of a treaty with a regime it had denounced in the past as a nest of revenge-minded Nazis and militarists.

1. Brandt, for example, is rumored in this secret annex to have renounced any linkage of ratification with a Berlin agreement, and to have undertaken to work for

the admission of both Germanies to the United Nations.

2. The rumors could be designed to allay the bitter reaction of Walter Ulbricht, but the supposed agreements are completely at variance with positions to which Brandt is firmly and publicly committed beyond retreat.

25X6

4. The curious factor is that the Communists should feel any need to gild the lily about a treaty which basically gives the Soviet Union such a big plus in Bonn's recognition of the status quo.
- B. The ancillary documents include a letter in which Bonn reaffirms Allied rights in regard to Berlin, another letter to the Soviet Government reasserting Bonn's continuing commitment to peaceful means in its pursuit of

German reunification, and a so-called "Declaration of Intent"--Bonn's pledge to negotiate agreements similar to the August 12 treaty with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.

1. The Declaration of Intent appears to have been the pretext for the Communist rumors, but as a matter of fact, Bonn provided texts of the agreements to the United States prior to the signing, and both the treaty and the Declaration of Intent were published in West Germany in mid-August.

- V. In any event, the West German Government is anxious to move ahead with broader Ostpolitik negotiations as quickly as possible.

- A. A sixth round of talks with the Poles is to begin early in October, and is expected to clear the way for signature of a treaty some time in November.

- B. Preliminary talks with the Czechs may begin soon.

C. An effort will also be made to get the East Germans involved in talks in some forum, although another meeting between Brandt and East German Premier Stoph--such as those earlier in 1970 at Erfurt and Kassel--does not appear to be imminent.

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Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

18 SEP 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

TO : J - Mr. Johnson

FROM : INR - Ray S. Cline (RSC)

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Agreements Affecting Soviet
Submarines in Cuba

1. There was never any formal US-Soviet agreement regarding the limits of Soviet military cooperation with Cuba following the 1962 missile crisis. Efforts to achieve such an agreement were stymied by persistent Cuban refusal to accept on-site inspection of its military facilities.

2. The Cuban crisis was resolved on the basis of Khrushchev's agreement in an October 28 letter to President Kennedy to "dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." President Kennedy's description of offensive weapons, contained in his October 22, 1962 speech to the American people and repeated in a note of the same date to the Soviet Government, included: (1) "offensive missile sites" for medium-range ballistic missiles effective up to 1,000 miles, and for intermediate-range ballistic missiles with over 2,000 mile range; and (2) "jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons" for which "the necessary bases are being prepared."

3. The Soviet-US talks at the UN on implementing the understanding reached between the two governmental leaders focused on withdrawal of the Soviet missiles, the IL-28 bombers, and nuclear warheads. We know of no mention in these talks of submarines

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

or naval base facilities, but add the caveat that we have not had access to the complete record of these talks. In his November 20, 1962 press conference announcing the lifting of the US quarantine of Cuba, President Kennedy also announced the withdrawal of Soviet ground units, which had been associated with the offensive weapons systems.

4. In reviewing the record of US official statements before, during, and after the Cuban missile crisis, we have found no specific reference to submarines or naval facilities. However, some statements made by both the President and the Secretary of State are relevant. For example, President Kennedy issued a warning during his press conference of September 13, 1962 that "If Cuba should ... become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies." Following resolution of the missile crisis Secretary Rusk, during a press conference held December 10, 1962, declared: "Certainly we in this hemisphere could not accept as a normal situation any Soviet military presence in Cuba." And on April 23, 1963, he asserted that "President Kennedy has made it utterly clear that we would not accept a reintroduction into Cuba of weapons which could strike at its neighbors, including the United States."

The attached INR Memorandum on this same subject, dated January 15, 1970, provides additional background information.

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MM-3
January 15, 1970

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Ray S. Cline

Subject: Cuban Missile Crisis: The Inspection and No-Invasion Issues - BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

In the aftermath of the Missile Crisis, the US refused to make a formal pledge not to invade Cuba since 1) the Cuban Government refused to allow UN verification that all offensive weapons (not only missiles) had been removed from the island and 2) no safeguards were established to prevent the future introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. These two conditions were set out in Kennedy's letter to Khrushchev of October 27, 1962. Although Khrushchev's reply of October 28 indicated that the Russians were prepared to reach agreement at least on UN inspection, no agreement was ever worked out.

Whether the Kennedy-Mikoyan talks of November 29 constituted an unwritten no-invasion "understanding" is less clear and might be explored further with the Legal Division. Both the USSR and Cuba have claimed that a no-invasion understanding was reached.

Inspection

U Thant, who flew to Cuba on October 30, was unable to secure Castro's permission to allow UN inspection of the removal of Russian missiles. "Inspection" had to be carried out by the US at sea and by air. On November 20, after Castro had also agreed to the removal of Soviet light bombers from Cuba, Kennedy lifted the US naval quarantine. The President stated at his press conference that day that US policies toward Cuba are "very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island," but he indicated his continuing dissatisfaction on the matter of inspection and safeguards. Cuba's answer, published on November 26, was that it reserved the right "to acquire arms of any kind for its defense" and that it would accept international inspection only if the UN were to inspect the territory of the US, Puerto Rico, and "other aggressive sites."

GROUP 1

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SECRET/LIMDIS

- 2 -

No-Invasion Pledge

On November 29, after his extended stay in Cuba, Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan talked with Kennedy for over three hours. Kennedy repeatedly assured Mikoyan, as he had stated publicly in the press conference on November 20, that it was not US policy to invade Cuba. He also told Mikoyan that the US was prepared to abide by the "spirit" of his correspondence with Khrushchev if the USSR did likewise. But he insisted that the US would not issue a formal no-invasion pledge unless assured that no offensive weapons are present in or reintroduced into Cuba. Kennedy also stressed that such a pledge would have to be conditional on Cuban abstention from involvement in or support for an invasion of any other country. If the USSR wanted a formal agreement, it would have to be worked out at the UN. On the other hand, Kennedy suggested, the USSR might prefer to let the matter rest with a presidential statement, such as that made on November 20.

Attached are some of the key documents involved:

- (a) Kennedy Letter to Khrushchev, October 27, 1962
(excerpts)
- (b) Khrushchev's Reply to Kennedy, October 28, 1962
(excerpts)
- (c) Kennedy Press Conference, November 20, 1962
(excerpts)
- (d) Kennedy Conversation with USSR Deputy Chairman Anastas Mikoyan, November 29, 1962
(excerpts)
- (e) Kennedy-Mikoyan Memorandum of Conversation
(full text)

Attachments:

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SECRET/LIMDIS

ATTACHMENT (a)

Excerpts from Kennedy Letter to Khrushchev: (UNC)
October 27, 1962

"As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals--which seem generally acceptable as I understand them--are as follows:

1) You would agree to remove these /i.e., all offensive/ weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2) We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise."

- ATTACHMENT (b)

Excerpts from Khrushchev Reply to Kennedy: (UNC)
October 28, 1962

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of 27 October 1962 that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

It is for this reason that we instructed our officers--these means /i.e., the Soviet missiles/ as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers--to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of 27 October, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable UN representatives to verify the dismantling of these means."

ATTACHMENT (c)

Excerpts from Kennedy Press Conference: (UNC)
November 20, 1962

Statement

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September, we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this Hemisphere.

We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic, and other efforts of this Hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Question

"Mr. President, another question on Cuba. Is it your position, sir, that you will issue a formal no-invasion pledge only after satisfactory arrangements have been made for verification and after adequate arrangements have been made to be sure that such weapons are not reintroduced once more?

Answer

Quite obviously, as I said in my statement, serious problems remain as to verification and reassurance, and therefore this matter of our negotiations really are not - have not been completed, and until they're completed, of course, I suppose we're not going to be fully satisfied that there will be peace in the Caribbean.

In regard to my feelings about what remains to be done, and on the matter of invasion, I think my statement is the best expression of our views."

ATTACHMENT (d)

Kennedy-Mikoyan Conversation (SECRET/LIMDIS)

November 23, 1962

(Excerpts From MemCon; Page and Paragraph indicated)

Page 5, Para. 1. Mikoyan: "...the President had spoken in his exchange with Chairman Khrushchev of a United States pledge of non-invasion."

Page 10, Para 7. Mikoyan:..."Unfortunately the United States draft declaration also contains a condition which applies to its non-invasion pledge. The condition in question is that the pledge applies only if Cuba abstains from any action which may be considered subversive or of a nature to undermine the governments of others of the Western Hemisphere. Otherwise the non-invasion guarantee is withdrawn."

Page 11, Para 3. Kennedy: ..."The President said that he is repeating here and now that it is not the intention of the United States Government to invade Cuba.

It is, however, much more difficult to put such a statement in an official document without surrounding it with the necessary guarantees."

Page 16, Para. 3. Kennedy: "The United States does not intend to invade Cuba and is ready to make that known. It must, however, insist on (1) a minimum of control, and (2) the expression of its obligations under the Rio Treaty. The Rio Treaty has been ratified by the United States Senate and is a part of United States legislation to which the President himself is subject. It cannot be ignored in a binding document.

If the Soviet Union prefers it, however, it may be possible to make the United States intent known in a way which would be quite as clear though not imply the same legal complications, for example, through a statement by the President, let us say, a press conference. In fact, the President has already made a statement of this kind at his last press conference. If, however, an official declaration is called for it must include references to all the aspects of the problem."

Page 17, Para. 4. Kennedy: "The President said that if no agreement can be reached on formal declarations, then it might be possible for him to clarify the position of the United States by means of a statement at a press conference

ATTACHMENT (d)

expressing the spirit of the exchange of correspondence between the two Heads of State. As a matter of fact, already at his last press conference the President had said that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba and that the same applied to the other nations of the Western Hemisphere."

Page 22, Para. 1. Mikoyan: "Nevertheless, Mr. Mikoyan has not fully understood what he must report to Chairman Khrushchev. Is it still the intention of the United States not to invade Cuba or is the United States backing away from that position?"

Kennedy: "The President said that he already has answered that question and said that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba. If the Soviet Union abides by the exchange of correspondence so will the United States."

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